Abstract The block cipher used in the Chinese Wireless LAN Standard (WAPI), SMS4, was recently renamed as SM4, and became the block cipher standard issued by the Chinese government. This paper gives a method for finding the linear approximations of SMS4. With this method, 19-round one-dimensional approximations are given, which are used to improve the previous linear cryptanalysis of SMS4. The 19-round approximations hold with bias 2 −62.27 ; we use one of them to leverage a linear attack on 23-round SMS4. Our attack improves the previous 23-round attacks by reducing the time complexity. Furthermore, the data complexity of our attack is further improved by the multidimensional linear approach.
Introduction
SMS4 was issued in 2006 by the Chinese government as the block cipher used in the wireless LAN products [1] . The English translation of the specification can be found in [2] . Recently, in 2012, SMS4 was announced as the Chinese commercial block cipher standard with the name SM4 , which implies that this cipher will be more widely used.
Since SMS4 was known to the public, quite a few cryptanalytic results were proposed to evaluate its security. Liu et al. proposed an integral attack on 13-round SMS4 in [3] ; Ji and Hu gave an algebraic cryptanalysis by analyzing the structure of the cipher [4] . In [5] , Lu presented a 14-round rectangle attack and a 16-round impossible differential attack. Later, Toz and Dunkelman claimed that the complexities in [5] are underestimated; they made a more comprehensive analysis of the attacks in [5] and further improved the results [6] . Zhang et al. gave a rectangle attack and a differential attack on SMS4 reduced to 16 rounds and 18 rounds, respectively [7] . Several attacks were proposed in [8] by Kim et al. , including rectangle and boomerang attacks on 18-round SMS4 as well as linear and differential attacks on the 22-round version. Etrog and Robshaw also presented a linear attack on 22-round SMS4 and discussed the possibility of extending the attack to 23 rounds by using multiple linear attack [9] . Zhang et al. gave an improved 22-round differential attack in [10] ; Liu et al. gave a multiple linear attack on SMS4 reduced to 22 rounds [11] . Su et al. further improved the result in [10] by proposing a differential attack on the 23-round version [12] ; the attack is the best previous attack in terms of attacked number of rounds and complexity. Cho and Nyberg responded to the question in [9] and proposed a multidimensional linear attack on 23-round SMS4 [13] . In addition, Zhang and Jin gave the lower bound of the number of linear active S-boxes for SMS4-like ciphers in [14] .
Linear cryptanalysis was proposed by Matsui [15] . The attack first finds the linear approximation between the plaintexts, ciphertexts, and the key bits with the highest bias, and then recovers one bit of the key information; this method is called Algorithm 1. Matsui also gave another algorithm named Algorithm 2 which is more efficient. Algorithm 2 adds an additional round to the bottom of the linear approximation; the attacker recovers a part of the key of the last round by guessing the partial key and ranking them by the number of plaintext-ciphertext pairs that satisfy the linear approximation. In 2007, Collard et al. [16] used fast Fourier transform to reduce the off-line time complexity of Matsui's Algorithm 2 from O(2 2k ) to O(k2 k ) where k is the number of bits in key guessing.
Kaliski and Robshaw proposed multiple approximations linear cryptanalysis that the same key bit information is involved in different approximations [17] [18] . Later, Biryukov et al. removed the restriction and presented a framework of linear attack using multiple linear approximations [19] . The attacks in [17] [18] [19] are all based on the assumption that the linear approximations are statistically independent. Using the multidimensional probability distribution and standard statistical methods, Hermelin et al. proposed the frameworks of multidimensional linear attacks without the assumption of statistical independence for Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 in [20] and [21] , respectively. Later, Hermelin and Nyberg gave another statistical method to reduce the off-line time complexity of Algorithm 1 [22] . Nguyen et al. improved the on-line complexity of Algorithm 2 in [23] .
Our Contributions. The linear attacks on SMS4 in [8-9, 11, 13] are all based on 18-round linear approximations whose fundamental parts are 5-round iterative linear approximations. The first contribution of this paper is proposing a new family of 19-round linear approximations with a different approach. We give a two-step method for finding the linear approximations. In the first step, the MILP manner proposed in [24] by Mouha et al. is adopted to obtain the framework of a 19-round linear approximation with the smallest number of active S-boxes. Since the result found by MILP is a lower bound that usually cannot be achieved, we add one more active S-box to each active round. Then in the second step, we give an algorithm to search for the linear approximation of this form. A useful lemma is given as the starting point of the algorithm. In order to reduce the time complexity caused by the large search space, a time-memory trade-off method is also used. Our algorithm returns eight 16-round linear approximations, each of which can be extended to 25 19-round linear approximations with the same bias. Our 19-round approximations have the same number of active S-boxes as the previous 18-round ones. While we cannot ensure that each active S-box has the highest bias, our 19-round approximations hold with bias 2 −62. 27 . The second contribution of the paper is improving the previous linear attacks on SMS4. With one of these 19-round linear approximations, we propose a linear attack on 23-round SMS4, whose data complexity is 2 126.54 , time complexity is about 2 122 23-round encryptions and memory complexity is about 2 116 bytes. By using more linear approximations and applying the multidimensional linear attack, the data complexity of our attack is improved to 2 122.6 , while the time and memory complexities are increased to 2 122.7 encryptions and 2 120.6 bytes, respectively. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the SMS4 block cipher and (multidimensional) linear attack, as well as some notations and definitions. Improved linear attacks on SMS4 are illustrated in Section 3. Finally, Section 4 concludes the paper.
Preliminaries
This section first denotes some notations and definitions used throughout the paper, and then gives a brief description of SMS4 as well as the method of (multidimensional) linear cryptanalysis.
Notations and Definitions
• ⊕: bit-wise exclusive-OR (XOR);
• ||: concatenation; • ≪ n: rotation to the left for n bits; • V n : the space of n-dimensional binary vectors;
where · is the bit-wise inner product. Definition 1. Given a linear mask Γ, a characteristic function χ is defined as:
Definition 2 (Branch Number [25] ). If we denote the byte weight of a vector v as HW (v), the linear branch number of a linear transformation L is
The correlation of a Boolean function g: V n → V 1 is defined as:
where # means the number of elements in the set. The bias of g is = c/2. Throughout the paper, when we refer to the values of correlations and biases, we mean the absolute values of them. Let the plaintext be (
4 , the encryption procedure can be described as:
, where R is the switch transformation . The decryption procedure is the same as the encryption procedure except that the subkeys are intervened in the reverse order.
The schematic description of one round of SMS4 is given in Fig.1 . One can know from the figure that the round function F is composed of subkey addition and function T , where there are two layers in T , which are the non-linear layer S and the linear transformation L. In layer S, an 8 × 8 S-box is used four times in parallel. The specification of the S-box could be found in [2] . L transforms a 32-bit word B to a 32-bit word D: One can easily verify that the linear branch number of the linear transformation L is 5.
In the key schedule algorithm, first denote
FK i (i = 0, 1, . . . , 3) are constants. Then the round subkeys are generated by:
where the function T is the same as T , except the linear transformation L is replaced by L :
CK j (j = 0, 1, . . . , 31) are constants, we refer to [2] for the details of them.
Note that, from the key schedule we deduce that if the subkeys of four successive rounds are known, then the main key is uniquely determined.
Linear Attack
Linear cryptanalysis aims to find the linear approximation of a cipher:
where Γ P , Γ C and Γ K are called the linear masks of P, C and K, respectively. Denote (1) holds with probability 1/2± , Matsui showed that with about | | −2 plaintexts, the one bit information κ of the key can be recovered. The method is so called Algorithm 1 in [15] . Matsui also provided a more efficient manner (Algorithm 2) by adding an additional round after the linear approximation; the last round key is guessed and ranked. We restate the framework of linear cryptanalysis which follows the principle of Biryukov et al.'s approach [19] .
• Distillation Phase. This phase can be regarded as a phase that preprocesses the plaintexts/ciphertexts. Each plaintext-ciphertext pair is evaluated by the parity of a part of the linear approximation that is related to the plaintext/ciphertext; counters indexed by the key-relevant parts of the plaintext and ciphertext are incremented or decremented accordingly.
• Analysis Phase. This phase guesses a part of the (equivalent) key which is necessary to compute the other part of the linear approximation, evaluates the parity of this part of linear approximation and sets up a counter for each guessed (equivalent) key by utilizing the values in the counters of the distillation phase. If we guess k-bit (equivalent) key and would like to get a-bit advantage , the top 2 k−a (equivalent) keys with the highest absolute values are the (equivalent) keys we will keep.
To be simplified, we will omit the switch transformation R when we attack the reduced versions of SMS4.
a-bit advantage means that with probability P S the right key is ranked among the top 2 k−a (equivalent) keys out of all 2 k key (equivalent) candidates.
• Search Phase. For each of the kept (equivalent) key, guess the remaining key information and recover the correct key by trial encryption.
A formal way to calculate the success rate P S and the data complexity can be found in [26] .
Multidimensional Linear Attack
Unlike [17] and [18] , Biryukov et al. proposed an approach that could use multiple linear approximations with different key bits involved [19] . However, these methods assume that the linear approximations are statistically independent.
Biryukov et al. 
. They also gave a heuristic enhancement to this method by adding more approximations that are dependent.
In [20] , Hermelin et al. constructed the multidimensional probability distribution; based on this, they proposed the statistical methods for multidimensional linear versions of Algorithm 1 [20] and Algorithm 2 [21] . We simply recall these here.
Let f : V l → V n be a vector Boolean function, binary vectors u i ∈ V l and w i ∈ V n (i = 0, . . . , m − 1) be linear masks such that (u i , w i ) are linearly independent. Denote the functions g i as:
Lemma 1 [27] .
For all b ∈ V m , the combined approximations b · g have the correlation c(b). Corollary 1 [20] . Let g : V l → V m be a Boolean function with probability distribution p and correlations [21] . Hermelin and Nyberg pointed out that Biryukov et al.'s enhancement is equivalent to the convolution method [22] , that is, for Biryukov et al.'s enhancement,
The key that minimizes B(κ) is suggested as the right key. Moreover,
Then the key that maximum
is supposed to be the right key. Hermelin and Nyberg also deduced that the LLR-method has the smallest data complexity given the success rate P S , and the data required by the convolution method has the same order of magnitude as the LLR-method in practice. Before we present our attack, we recall two important tools to compute matrix multiplication. Given a k-dimensional vector e and a matrix F of size k × k, the algorithm to obtain F e can be optimized when every entry of the matrix F satisfies [28] or fast Fourier transform [29] . In [16] , Collard et al. proposed that when F (i, j) can be denoted as a function of i ⊕ j, the computation of F e can be achieved by three products between a Fourier matrix and a vector. That implies F e can be computed in O(3k log k) operations when
Improved Linear Attacks on SMS4
In this section, we first introduce how to construct our new linear approximations which are quite different from the previous ones with a semi-automatic method. Based on one of these linear approximations, we then give a 23-round attack on SMS4. Finally, we improve the data complexity of the attack by multidimensional linear extension.
Novel Way to Find the Linear Approximations of SMS4
Biham pointed out that similar to differential cryptanalysis [30] , characteristics can be defined in linear cryptanalysis [31] . Consequently, one can find the linear approximations of a cipher by concatenating characteristics of each round. However, there are important differences for the concatenation rule:
• For the XOR operation: if x = y ⊕ z, Γ x , Γ y and Γ z are the masks of x, y and z, respectively, then Γ x = Γ y = Γ z .
• For the branching operation: if x = y = z, Γ x , Γ y and Γ z are the masks of x, y and z, respectively, then
• For the linear layer L: if y = L(x), Γ x and Γ y are the masks of x and y, respectively, then
t is the transpose of L. With these rules, one can find a linear approximation just as finding a differential trail. The rest of the task is to design a manner to find a linear approximation that is as long as possible. In this subsection, we propose a new method to search for the linear approximations of SMS4. The purpose of our method is to seek for the linear approximations with as few active S-boxes as possible, which results in non-iterative ones that are different from those in [8-9, 11, 13] . We use a two-step procedure to achieve this goal.
In the first step, we would like to determine the lower bound of the number of active S-boxes of the linear approximation, as well as the positions of the active rounds. As proposed by Mouha et al. in [24] , this can be done using Mixed-Integer Liner Programming (MILP). For linear cryptanalysis, Mouha et al. first constructed the equations with extra binary dummy variables for all the branching operations and the linear transformations in the cipher, then they put the equations into an MILP solver for the answer. For example, if the masks of a branching operation are Γ x , Γ y , Γ z and the binary dummy variable is d 1 , then the equations for this branching operation are:
Similarly, if the input and output byte-masks of a linear transformation are Γ in1 , Γ in2 , Γ in3 , Γ in4 , Γ out1 , Γ out2 , Γ out3 , Γ out4 and the dummy variable is d 2 , then the equations are:
Here b is the linear branch number, in the case of SMS4, b = 5. Following this method, we generate the MILP for SMS4 and put it to the solver implemented in SAGE . Since the best previous linear approximation is 18 rounds, we try to find a linear approximation with 19 rounds. The solver gives us a 19-round linear approximation with one active S-box in the 1st, 4th, 5th, 8th, 9th, 12th, 13th, 16th and 17th rounds, respectively. However, what we have found is only a lower bound for the number of S-boxes, and one can never find such a linear approximation due to the limitation of degrees of freedom. Our solution is fixing the positions of the active rounds and increasing the number of active S-boxes until we find a valid linear approximation. We find that a linear approximation is probably valid when the number of active S-boxes in each active round is 2, i.e., the linear approximation we try to find is with the form:
In the second step, we give an algorithm to search for linear approximations with the above form. A lemma that is the design criteria of the algorithm will be given first.
Lemma 2. In order to form the above 19-round linear approximation, the input masks of the T functions of the two consecutive active rounds should be the same.
Proof. Denote Γ 
for all Γ 
Push the quadruple (Γ 
for all Γ −15 , we found eight 16-round linear approximations with reasonable bias that can be extended to useful 19-round approximations. The input and the output masks (in hexadecimal) of the active T functions of these approximations are given in Table 1 . Our program, which is implemented in C++, runs less than two days with a laptop. Note that one can further reduce the running time: instead of steps 32 and 33, we put the resulting (Γ When extending backward to 19 rounds, we know that the number of active S-boxes in the first round is 2. Since for each S-box, there are 5 linear masks that lead to the highest bias, a total number of 200 19-round linear approximations with the same bias can be found. One of these linear approximations can be found in Table 2. In Table 2 , the fourth and the fifth columns stand for the output and the input masks of the S-box layer, respectively; the sixth column indicates the bias of the round, and the rest of the columns give the masks of the intermediate values. We learn from [9] that the pilingup lemma [15] works quite well for SMS4, thus the bias of the linear approximation in Table 2 is about 2 −62.27 .
Linear Attacks on 23-Round SMS4
We add four additional rounds to the bottom of the 19-round linear approximation in Table 2 and give a linear attack on 23-round SMS4 (Fig.2 ) using Matsui's Algorithm 2, as well as the technique in [16] .
Denote α = 0xae007d6b, β = 0x00233300, γ = 0xd3f00289, δ = 0x6bd3d389 and ζ = 0x16009f6b.
Since from the linear approximation, we have α·P
we need to guess the subkeys of the last four rounds and rank them.
We have Round  4  5  8  9  12  13  16  17  Input  b800e200  b800e200  b8e20000  b8e20000  00e2e200  00e2e200  b800e200  b800e200  Output  d3d33189  16009f6b  6bd3d389  aee29f6b  d331d389  ae007d6b  d3d33189  16009f6b   Input  00b800e2  00b800e2  00b8e200  00b8e200  0000e2e2  0000e2e2  00b800e2  00b800e2  Output  89d3d331  6b16009f  896bd3d3  6baee29f  89d331d3  6bae007d  89d3d331  6b16009f   Input  e200b800  e200b800  0000b8e2  0000b8e2  e20000e2  e20000e2  e200b800  e200b800  Output  3189d3d3  9f6b1600  d3896bd3  9f6baee2  d389d331  7d6bae00  3189d3d3  9f6b1600   Input  00e200b8  00e200b8  e20000b8  e20000b8  e2e20000  e2e20000  00e200b8  00e200b8  Output  d33189d3  009f6b16  d3d3896b  e29f6bae  31d389d3  007d6bae  d33189d3  009f6b16   Input  b800e200  b800e200  00e2e200  00e2e200  b8e20000  b8e20000  b800e200  b800e200  Output  16009f6b  d3d33189  ae007d6b  d331d389  aee29f6b  6bd3d389  16009f6b  d3d33189   Input  00b800e2  00b800e2  0000e2e2  0000e2e2  00b8e200  00b8e200  00b800e2  00b800e2  Output  6b16009f  89d3d331  6bae007d  89d331d3  6baee29f  896bd3d3  6b16009f  89d3d331   Input  e200b800  e200b800  e20000e2  e20000e2  0000b8e2  0000b8e2  e200b800  e200b800  Output  9f6b1600  3189d3d3  7d6bae00  d389d331  9f6baee2  d3896bd3  9f6b1600  3189d3d3   Input  00e200b8  00e200b8  e2e20000  e2e20000  e20000b8  e20000b8  00e200b8  00e200b8  Output  009f6b16  d33189d3  007d6bae  31d389d3  e29f6bae  d3d3896b  009f6b16  d33189d3 The bias of function T can be calculated by the pilling lemma [15] . 19 0x6bd3d389 (0xf44c0000) * 0x16009f6b 0 0 Note: * means we do not concern about this mask, as it is not within the linear approximation. The mask in "()" is calculated from X 19 . Here we do not need to consider the bias of these S-boxes. 
In our attack, we aim to obtain an 8-bit advantage from the subkey bits we guessed. The reason is that we guess the subkeys of four successive rounds, and we can deduce the main key once these subkeys are known. [16] , we know that each row or column of M defines the complete matrix. As a result, only the first column of M would be stored;
g to the corresponding row of the first column of M ; 6) using the technique in [16] , efficiently compute M t = e with fast Fourier transform [29] . Success Rate. By [26] , the success rate
. By the novel result in [32] ,
As shown in [32] , the most deviations between the two models occur when the adversary seeks a particularly big advantage or the data complexity gets close to the whole codebook. The advantage a in our attack is only 8, thus we try to reduce the data complexity in the next subsection.
Reducing the Data Complexity of the 23-Round Attack by Multidimensional Extension
As mentioned in Subsection 3.1, for each of the 16-round linear approximations in Table 1 , we have five input masks with the highest bias for each of the two active S-boxes in the first round when extending backward to 19 rounds. For the 16-round linear approximation we used in the previous subsection, the input masks of the two active S-boxes in the first round with the highest bias are given in Table 3 . 2  0x1f  0x33  0x23  0x4e  0x3c  0x8c  0x95  0xbf  0xa9 0xf1
In this subsection, we will use these 25 linear approximations simultaneously and mount an multidimensional linear attack on SMS4. By studying the 25 linear approximations, we found that they could be spanned by m = 6 linearly independent linear approximations, where m is the number of base approximations. Then we can apply the theory of multidimensional linear attack in [20] [21] [22] [21] , the success rate P S = Φ( NC p − Φ −1 (1 − 2 −m−a )) = 89.55%; if we evaluate the success rate by means of [32] , it will be 88.71%.
Conclusions
This paper improved the best previous linear cryptanalysis of block cipher SMS4. A summary of some primary cryptanalytic results as well as our results on SMS4 is given in Table 4 . Note that, since the attacks are neither applied to the full cipher nor practical, they do not harm the security of the full SMS4. 21 arithmetic operations in the original paper. We convert it to the number of 22-round encryptions by assuming that one arithmetic operation is equivalent to one-round SMS4 encryption, which is quite overestimated. Hence it is reasonable.
